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NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING AND COMBINED 
SEWER OVERFLOWS (CSOs): CONSENSUS SAVES 
OSSIFICATION? 
Siobhan Mee* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As an innovative supplement to procedures for drafting regula-
tions, negotiated rulemaking debuted on the administrative stage in 
the early 1980s.1 The process is a means of achieving improved regu-
lation through cooperation between government agencies, the regu-
lated community, and public interest groupS.2 The Negotiated Rule-
making Act of 1990, the National Performance Review of 1993, and 
several directives by President Clinton demonstrate the support ne-
gotiated rule making has generated.3 Despite such political endorse-
ments, however, federal agencies hesitate to integrate negotiation in-
to major rulemakings.4 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
which confronts issues as complex and controversial as any regulatory 
body, is one exception. 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1997-1998. 
1 See DAVID M. PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 
1 (1995). Negotiated rulemaking is sometimes referred to as regulatory negotiation or "reg-neg." 
See id. 
2 See id. 
3 See id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993); Richard H. Pildes & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995). 
4 See William H. Miller, Bypassing the Lawyers: "Regulatory Negotiation" Gets Test in Agen-
cies, INDUS. WK., July 23,1986, at 20; see also Lee M. Thomas, The Successful Use of Regulatory 
Negotiation by EPA, 13 ADMIN. L. NEWS 1,4 (1987). Regulatory negotiations are more common 
at the state and local levels than at the federal level. Interview with Lawrence Susskind, Ford 
Professor of Urban & Environmental Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in Cam-
213 
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This Comment will assess EPA's reliance on negotiated rulemaking 
and evaluate whether negotiated rulemaking was an appropriate me-
thod of addressing the challenge of combined sewer overflows (CSOs). 
Section II traces the history of negotiated rulemaking and outlines 
the selection criteria for and procedural components of the process. 
Section III discusses the benefits of and potential drawbacks to ne-
gotiated rulemaking. Section IV briefly describes EPA's Reg-Neg 
Project, through which the agency has monitored and promoted the 
use of negotiated rulemaking. Section V explores the problem of 
CSOs in general, including their history, impact, challenges, and con-
trol options. Section VI focuses on the generation of support for a 
negotiated CSO dialogue. Finally, Section VII assesses the 1994 CSO 
Control Policy. Notwithstanding the continued occurrence of CSOs, 
the CSO negotiations were the most effective means of addressing 
this environmental nightmare. 
II. NEGOTIATED RULE MAKING 
A. History 
Regulatory issues today are dramatically more complex than those 
that agencies faced when Congress enacted the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) in 1946.6 To protect against the abuse of adminis-
trative discretion and to encourage sound decisionmaking, courts in 
the 1960s began to withdraw the broad deference that agencies had 
enjoyed since the New Deal.6 Judges introduced hybrid rulemaking 
requirements and "hard look" review to compensate for the inade-
quate safeguards in APA notice and comment procedures.7 The proc-
ess-oriented inquiry into informal decisionmaking now involves a de-
termination of whether the agency has taken a hard look at the 
bridge, Mass. (Feb. 4,1997); Interview with Tim Williamson, Attorney, EPA Region 1, in Boston, 
Mass. (Jan. 17, 1997). 
6 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1982) (Recommenda-
tion 82--4). 
6 See Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rule-
rrw,king, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134 (1985). 
7 See id. at 136; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) 
(holding that even where formal ruIemaking provisions of APA do not apply, presumption of 
deference to agency will not shield action from probing in-depth review); United States v. Nova 
Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring concise general state-
ment of basis and purpose of agency action to demonstrate what major issues were ventilated 
by informal proceedings and why agency reacted to them as it did). 
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relevant factors and policy alternatives, and has reached a decision 
through the reasoned exercise of its discretion.s 
Stricter judicial scrutiny has formalized the informal rule making 
process.9 Regulations must be based upon a public record and capable 
of withstanding the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review.lO 
Although these limits on agency discretion have increased account-
ability and fairness, they have had adverse consequences as well. ll 
Critics believe that the process fosters adversarialism, as participants 
take extreme positions, withhold information, and attack the legiti-
macy of opposing viewpoints.12 The typical focus of public comments 
is on finding fault with, rather than possible improvements to, an 
agency's proposal.lS 
Another criticism of traditional rulemaking is that it is slow and 
cumbersome.14 Major rules require an average of three and one-half 
years for their creation and promulgation.15 A subsequent court chal-
lenge, which EPA estimates to be an eighty-five percent possibility 
for each of its regulations, may delay the implementation of a rule 
even further. IS 
In response to the perceived malaise of administrative law, alter-
native approaches to traditional decisionmaking surfaced in the late 
1970sY In particular, various forms of regulatory negotiation were 
offered as a means of restoring legitimacy to administrative rulemak-
8 See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. 
P A. L. REV. 509, 511 (1974). 
9 See id. 
ID Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). 
11 Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 136. 
12 See Intent to Form an Advisory Committee to Negotiate Proposed Farmworker Protection 
Standards for Agricultural Pesticides, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,030 (1985) [hereinafter Pesticide Notice]. 
13 See id. 
14 See Clare M. Ryan, Regulatory Negotiation: Learning from Experiences at the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 203, 206 (J. Walton Blackburn & Willa Marie Bruce eds., 1995). 
15 See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULA-
TORY POLICY 607 (3d ed. 1992). For example, EPA's initial preparation of a rule requires 
eighteen to twenty months. [d. Over the next three to six months, EPA receives public 
comments on its proposal. [d. There usually are hundreds of adverse comments which must be 
analyzed and responded to individually, a step that takes approximately sixteen months. [d. If 
EPA revises its proposed rule, it also may ask for another round of comments. See id.; Thomas, 
supra note 4, at 3. 
16 See BREYER & STEWART, supra note 15. 
17 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Develop-
ment of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 863, 865 (1987); see also 
Philip J. Harter, Negotiated Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (1982). 
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ing.18 Initial support for these reform proposals was far from resound-
ing.19 When publishing his seminal article on regulatory negotiation, 
reg-neg pioneer Philip J. Harter privately considered the concept too 
radical to interest those serious about administrative law.20 He saw 
the 1970s as a time of increasing judicialization; wedding negotiation 
to the regulatory process went completely against the trend.21 
The same year that Professor Harter's article appeared in the 
Georetoum Law Journal, the Administrative Conference of the 
United States (ACUS) integrated his proposals into a formal recom-
mendation.22 ACUS's endorsement persuaded EPA, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, and the Occupational Safety & Health Admini-
stration to try regulatory negotiation.23 These agencies quickly 
established the practical soundness of negotiated rulemaking.24 In 
1985, ACUS adopted another set of guidelines for negotiating pro-
posed regulations.26 The Conference explained that its two recommen-
dations were to be used together as a guide, a "conceptual framework 
within which to plan and conduct negotiations in a particular proceed-
ing."26 ACUS recognized the need for flexibility in negotiations, em-
phasizing that the process is not susceptible to formal models or rigid 
patterns.27 
The first congressional debates over the concept of negotiated rule-
making occurred two years before the initial ACUS recommenda-
18 See Harter, supra note 17, at 113. Arbitration, fact-finding, and mediation are alternatives 
to formal agency hearings; negotiated rulemaking is an alternative to hybrid rulemaking. 
Perritt, supra note 17, at 865. 
19 Kathrin Day Lassila, See You Later, Litigator: Regulatory Negotiation 7bward Consensus, 
AMICUS J. 5 (Summer 1992). 
20 See id. 
21 See id. At a 1994 conference, Professor Harter stated: "Frankly I was going to propose 
[regulatory negotiation] as sort of an academic exercise. I did not think it would be adopted, 
but it has surpassed my initial predictions." Colloquium, The Fifth Annual Robert C. Byrd 
Conference on the Administrative Process, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 23, 57 (1994) [hereinafter 
Fifth Annual Byrd Conference]. 
22 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1982) (Recommen-
dation 82-4). 
28 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Report, 2 BNA 62 (Feb. 18, 1988) [hereinafter ADR 
Report]. 
24 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommen-
dation 85-4). 
26 See id. 'lb emphasize that it was addressing the negotiation of rules rather than other uses 
of negotiations in the regulatory process, ACUS substituted the term ''negotiated l'Ulemaldng" 
for Recommendation 82-4's "regulatory negotiation." See id. 
26 [d. 
27 See id. 
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tion.28 Joint hearings held by the Senate Select Committee on Small 
Business and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs re-
sulted in a bill to encourage the formation of regulatory negotiation 
committees.29 Through explicit congressional approval, the bill's sup-
porters intended to confirm that federal agencies had the statutory 
authority to employ this procedural device.30 However, neither the 
House nor the Senate acted upon the bill. Between 1980 and 1987, 
other proposals to create a statutory framework for regulatory nego-
tiation similarly failed to generate the necessary support.31 In 1988, 
the Senate passed a bill sponsored by Senator Carl Levin, whose 
statement in support of the House companion bill emphasized the 
winning track record of negotiated rulemaking.32 Although provisions 
in several laws directed agencies to use negotiated rulemaking when 
developing regulations in specific areas, the House took no final action 
on Levin's bill.33 It was not until 1990 that Congress enacted legisla-
tion devoted exclusively to the process. 
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (Reg-Neg Act) affirmed 
the preexisting authority of agencies to use the procedure and pro-
vided a framework similar to that of ACUS's guidelines.34 Passage of 
the Reg-Neg Act did not eliminate any of the statutory requirements 
applicable to agencies.35 Negotiated rulemaking supplements rather 
than replaces the procedures set out in the Administrative Procedure 
Act and in individual enabling statutes.36 Agencies also must comply 
with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) when establishing 
negotiated rulemaking committees.37 
28 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 87. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 The Negotiated Rulemaking Act: Hearings on H.R. 3052 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis. 
Law and Gov't Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Congo 2, 3 (1988) 
(statement of Senator Carl Levin) [hereinafter Levin statement]. 
33 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 87; see also Levin statement, supra note 32, at 
3 (citing Hawkins-Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improvements Act and Price-An-
derson Amendments Act, which direct the Education Secretary and Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission respectively to use regulatory negotiation). Congress has continued to mandate regu-
latory negotiations in certain legislation. See Fifth Annual Byrd Conference, supra note 21, at 
58. 
34 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommen-
dation 85-4); Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561,563 (1994). 
36 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 2. 
36 See id. 
37 See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. § 565(a)(I) (1994). Legislation requiring 
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FACA addresses both the formation and operation of federal 
agency advisory committees.3s Groups established or utilized by agen-
cies to obtain advice or recommendations must be chartered under 
FACA.39 Initially, agencies perceived FACA to be an impediment to 
the use of negotiating procedures.40 Many of the Act's requirements, 
however, either are flexible enough to enable effective negotiations41 
or were modified by the Reg-Neg Act.42 Other FACA requirements 
are recognized as important components to a successful negotiation, 
including the establishment of a committee only if it is in the public 
interest and after public notice,43 a balance of viewpoints,44 and a 
record of all meetings.46 Thus, instead of unduly obstructing negoti-
ated rulemaking, FACA's requirements have increased participants' 
confidence in the process.46 
agencies to use regulatory negotiation in the past specifically exempted them from complying 
with FACA. PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 71. 
38 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 71. 
39 See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 3 (1994). 
40 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1982) (Recommen-
dation 82-4) (noting how FACA has dampened administrative enthusiasm for attempts to build 
on experience with successful negotiations); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 145 n.69 
(claiming that use of FACA charter "situates the negotiating committee within the labyrinths 
of existing federal administrative procedures"); see also Daniel J. Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Break-
ing Down Walls: Negotiated Rulemaking at EPA, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 29, 30-31 
(1985). 
4\ See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommen-
dation 85-4). For example, courts and agencies often interpret the Reg-Neg Act to permit 
private meetings where necessary to promote an effective exchange of views. See id; see also 
Owen Olpin et aI., Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution to Rulemaking, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 575, 
584 (1987). 
42 See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 566(c) (1994) (modifying FACA § 10(e) to 
enable a person from outside federal government to serve as facilitator). 
43 5 U.S.C. App. § 9(a)(2). 
44Id. at § 5(2). 
46Id. at § 10(c). 
46 See Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 40, at 40; Olpin et aI., supra note 41; see also Clean Water 
Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and the Env't of the House 
Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103rd Congo 42 (1994) (statement of the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC» (commenting on the "very salutary effect" of FACA's requirements). 
Toward the end of the Bush Administration, a moratorium on FACA committee charters made 
it nearly impossible for agencies to use negotiated rulemaking. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 215. 
The Clinton Administration ended the moratorium and has been very supportive of regulatory 
negotiation. See id. 
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B. Selection Criteria 
In Professor Harter's first negotiated rulemaking article, he out-
lined an extensive list of conditions that improve the likelihood of 
successful negotiations.47 Administrative law theorists challenged the 
importance of these criteria,48 and Professor Harter later noted that 
some of the former requisites "have been falling by the wayside as 
people get comfortable with the process."49 Nonetheless, negotiated 
rulemaking only is appropriate for a narrow spectrum of issues.60 The 
Reg-N eg Act directs agencies to consider many of Professor Harter's 
suggested elements in evaluating the suitability of negotiated rule-
making in a particular context.61 
1. Need for a Rule or Policy 
Beginning with the basics, an agency must determine the need for 
a rule or policy.52 Issues should be well defined and understood, with 
no further research required for their resolution.53 The experience of 
EPA's Drinking Water Advisory Committee illustrates the impor-
tance of this criterion, as gaps in scientific knowledge thwarted its 
efforts to negotiate a rule.54 Professor Harter also stressed that where 
parties are still trying to generate or demonstrate power, through 
such methods as lawsuits or media campaigns, their jockeying for 
position will preclude resolution of the issues.56 Yet precisely how ripe 
the matter must be for resolution is debatable.56 Public dispute nego-
47 See Harter, supra note 17, at 4~6. 
48 See, e.g., Olpin et aI., supra note 41, at 576; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 139. 
49 Fifth Annual Byrd Conference, supra note 21, at 59. 
60 See Miller, supra note 4, at 20. Reg-Neg Project Director Chris Kirtz believes that only five 
to ten percent of EPNs regulations lend themselves to negotiated rulemaking. [d.; see also 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulem.aking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recom-
mendations by the AdminiBtrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1675 
(1986); Thomas, supra note 4, at 46 (emphasizing importance of screening candidate regulations). 
61 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 563 (1994); see also PRITZKER & DALTON, supra 
note 1, at 24 (listing EPNs selection criteria). 
62 5 U .S.C. § 563(a}(l}. 
63 See Harter, supra note 17, at 50-51; Bee also Philip J. Harter, The Role of Courts in 
Regulatory Negotiation-A Response to Judge Wald, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 56 (1986). 
64 See Drinking Water: Disinfectant/Byproduct Negotiation Process Leaves Scientific Gaps, 
Advisory Board Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1201 (Oct. 29, 1993) (explaining how negotiators 
could not develop rules for disinfectants and disinfection byproducts without data assessing 
associated risks). 
66 See Harter, supra note 17, at 47. 
66 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 139. 
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tiations often involve a changing and expanding constellation of is-
sues, as well as a shifting set of stakeholders who are not certain why 
they are at the negotiating table.57 Several EPA negotiations demon-
strate that success can be achieved despite some confusion about 
participants and agendas.58 
Less controversial than the ripeness element is the need for diverse 
issues and a range of possible outcomes in order to provide negotiat-
ing parties with room to compromise.59 This criterion rarely becomes 
an obstacle, since a potential object of regulation usually raises mul-
tiple issues.60 Participants should be able to rank their interests, yield-
ing on those of less priority to maximize their overall position.61 Be-
cause what is critical to one party may not be so decisive to another, 
negotiations can result in a "Jack Sprat" rule making. 62 
2. Limited Identifiable Interests 
The Reg-Neg Act also requires agencies to consider the number of 
interests that a proposed rule will affect.63 While negotiations among 
people in a crowded auditorium would not be feasible, all parties with 
a significant bona fide interest in the outcome of a rule should be 
represented.64 Harter initially recommended a limit of fifteen partici-
pants, based on the logistical consideration of fitting everyone around 
the negotiating table.66 What is deemed the appropriate limit has 
increased with experience; successful negotiating groups have ex-
ceeded twenty-five participants.66 As important as it is to limit the 
67 See id. at 156-57. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 139-40; Harter, supra note 17, at 50; see also PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 
1, at 38. 
60 See Harter, supra note 17, at 50. Most subjects of negotiated rulemaking can be splintered 
at least into the following subissues: the extent of the problem, the stringency of the response, 
the manner of compliance, the components of the regulation, and the date of implementation. 
See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 38. As in the nursery rhyme in which Jack Sprat 
could eat no fat and his wife could eat no lean, negotiators often weigh their respective interests 
differently and are able to make mutually desirable trade-offs. See id. 
68 Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 563(1)(2) (1994). 
64 See Harter, supra note 17, at 46; Olpin et al., supra note 41, at 577. 
66 See Harter, supra note 17, at 46 (recognizing no particular magic in the number 15). 
66 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 156; see also Pesticide Notice, supra note 12, at 
38,031; Olpin et al., supra note 41, at 577 (citing the asbestos negotiation). Harter now advises 
that the number of interests involved in a negotiated rulemaking be winnowed down to 20 or 
25, so as to obviate the need for Yankee Stadium. See Fifth Annual Byrd Conference, supra 
note 21, at 59. 
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number of negotiators, failure to secure representation of all material 
interests leaves the rule open to subsequent challenge.67 Conveners 
can reconcile this twofold demand by encouraging the delegation and 
"pyramiding" of representation.68 
3. Balanced Representation and Good-Faith Negotiation 
The third statutory prerequisite for negotiated rulemaking is its 
most complex: agencies must consider the likelihood of convening an 
appropriately balanced committee whose members are willing to ne-
gotiate in good faith to reach consensus.69 Requirements embedded in 
section 562(a)(3) of the Reg-Neg Act include the concurrence of each 
participant with committee decisions,70 the absence of pressure to 
compromise a fundamental value,71 and the desire of each party to use 
the process.72 
Balanced power among the represented interests is necessary to 
avoid the domination of the proceedings by an individual party.73 
Where each participant has enough power to prevent the others from 
acting unilaterally, the outcome is not predetermined and thus nego-
tiation is appropriate.74 Where a significant imbalance of power exists, 
any party sensing that its concurrence is not essential to agreement 
will pursue an alternative means of pressing its claims.76 Negotiated 
67 See Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 40, at 40; see also NRDC statement, supra note 46 Oearning 
from CSO negotiation that "all stakeholders have to be in the room to reach an agreement that 
has staying power''); Harter, supra note 17, at 53 (explaining complexity of this requirement 
where interests change as issues expand or contract). 
68 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 155 (explaining how ERM-McGlennen skillfully 
involves large number of groups indirectly in negotiated rulemaking). As a practical matter, the 
Office of Management and Budget should somehow be included in the negotiation process since 
the promulgation of a major rule is contingent upon its approval. See Regulatory Negotiations: 
Four Perspectives, DR FORUM 8, 10 (Jan. 1986) [hereinafter Four Perspectives]; see also ADR 
Report, BUpra note 23, at 81. 
69 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3) (1994). 
70 See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
72 See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
73 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 39; Harter, supra note 17, at 46. Although an 
agency always reserves the right to walk away from the negotiating table and issue its own 
version of a rule, the threat of political and judicial action by the other parties constrains the 
agency's exercise of its power. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 154 (illustrating how 
political pressure provided a check on EPA's power; EPA wanted to avoid appearing responsible 
for failure of negotiations); Bee alBo Philip J. Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative 
Law: The History, Needs and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393, 1418-19 
(1984) (distinguishing between agency's authority to issue regulation and its power to do so). 
74 See Harter, supra note 17, at 46. 
75 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 139. Any resolution by the remaining negotiators 
will be undermined by the "less-powerful" party's judicial or political challenges. See id. 
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rulemaking committees often avoid the risk of one participant being 
outvoted by defining "consensus" as unanimity.76 
A negotiating party will be unable to represent its interests ade-
quately if forced to compromise a fundamental value.77 Negotiation 
cannot resolve matters of principle or problems "of attitude and phi-
losophy not subject to scientific quantification."78 Agencies therefore 
must distinguish issues involving "how to" decisions from those em-
broiled in "what" decisions.79 Negotiated rulemaking is appropriate 
for solving "how to" problems, such as how to implement a reme-
dial action program or how to modify permits.80 The process is less 
effective for answering "what" questions which involve value-laden 
choices, such as acceptable levels of risks.81 
In considering the likelihood of good-faith negotiations, an agency 
should evaluate participants' incentives to reach negotiated agree-
ment.82 A party's incentive to engage in the negotiation process is 
determined by what it considers to be its ''best alternative to negoti-
ated agreement" (BATNA).83 Where a party believes its BATNA is 
superior to all of the possible negotiation outcomes, it has no incentive 
to participate. To draw an analogy to the resolution of a dispute 
between litigants, a plaintiff who expects a jury verdict to result in a 
certain net gain will negotiate a settlement only if the defendant is 
willing to offer more than that sum. In the context of negotiated 
76 See Fifth Annual Byrd Conference, supra note 21, at 60. 
77 See id. at 59 (explaining that issues such as abortion and homosexuals in military are not 
appropriate for negotiation as they reflect too deeply held views); Harter, supra note 17, at 49; 
Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 139. 
78 See Harter, supra note 17, at 50 n.272 (citing Joint Hearings Before the Select Comm. on 
Small Bus. & the Subcomm. on Oversight ofG(Y/)'t Management of the Senate Comm. of Gov't 
Affairs on Regulatory Negotiation, 96th Congo 8 (1980) (statement of Harrison Loesch, Vice 
President, Government Relations, Peabody Coal Company»; see also Marianne Lavelle, "Reg-
Neg" Revving Up in D. C., NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 21 (attributing breakdown of Department 
of Transportation's negotiations to impasse on matters of principle). 
79 See Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, PUB. ADMIN. REV., 
July-Aug. 1988, at 764, 770; Four Perspectives, supra note 68, at 8. 
80 See Fiorino, supra note 79. 
81 See id.; Harter, supra note 17, at 49-50. 
82 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)(B) (1994); Perritt, supra note 50, at 
1636-37 (predicting success only when people who are able to use other processes have incentive 
to participate in negotiations and to reach negotiated agreement). 
83 See Perritt, supra note 45, at 1637; see also Harter, supra note 17, at 49 (distinguishing 
between "zero sum games" in which one party wins only at expense of the other, and "win-win" 
situations where both parties gain from negotiation). See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM 
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed. 1991). 
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rulemaking, perceptions of what an agency will do in the absence of 
negotiation determine the BATN As of interested parties.84 
4. Timely Consensus 
The Reg-Neg Act also directs agencies to assess the likelihood that 
the proposed committee will reach consensus within a fixed period of 
time.86 Deadlines often are perceived as an essential tool for moving 
negotiations and avoiding delay tactics.86 The pressure of an approach-
ing deadline helps parties make the difficult choices that are necessary 
to reach consensus.87 Typically, deadlines are provided by the agency's 
commitment to develop the rule by itself if the negotiations produce 
nothing by a certain date, or by a legislative or judicial mandate for 
agency action within a limited time period.88 
5. Agency's Ability and Willingness to Participate 
Although the Reg-Neg Act only instructs an agency to consider the 
adequacy of its resources and its willingness to commit such resources 
to the committee, agency participation is more active in the ideal 
scenario.89 Professor Harter distinguishes among three special roles 
84 See Perritt, supra note 50, at 1637; see also ADR Report, supra note 23, at 63 (arguing that 
BATNAs are likely to be inferior to what participants can achieve through negotiated rulemak-
ing); Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 153 (suggesting that uncertainty about what their 
BATNAs are may help bring participants to EPA bargaining table; prospect of negotiation 
usually looks as good as or better than alternatives). 
85 See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(4); Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 
(1982) (Recommendation 82-4). 
88 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 140; see also John T. Dunlop, The Negotiations 
Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1421, 143EHJ7 (1984). Several of EPA's 
experiences, however, proved that energetic, good-faith negotiators are as important to timely 
consensus as a tight schedule. See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 157. 
87 See Harter, supra note 53, at 56 n.21. Negotiators often consider it politically imprudent to 
return to their constituencies before deadline claiming that they got all that was possible. See 
id. 
88 See id. at 56; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 140 n.44; see also Neil Eisner, 
Regularory Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED. B. NEWS J. 371, 373 (1984) (listing 
Department of Transportation's public commitment to issue another NPRM in near future as 
element of successful negotiated rulemaking). 
89 See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(6); Olpin et al., supra note 41, at 586 (emphasizing importance of EPA's 
active participation as party with tremendous technical resources). ACUS recommends differ-
ent forms of agency participation, ranging from negotiating as an equal party to acting as an 
observer and commenting on possible agency reactions and concerns. See Procedures for Nego-
tiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommendation 85-4). 
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of an agency sponsoring negotiations: administrator,90 resource con-
sultant,91 and participant.92 In each of these capacities, the agency 
treads a fine line between taking the lead in the negotiations and 
being perceived as directing particular results.93 The risks associated 
with nonparticipation, however, make this delicate balance worth the 
effort.94 Full agency participation ensures that negotiators discuss 
the relevant issues and reach a consensus that is acceptable to the 
agency.96 
6. Commitment to Use of Consensus 
The final consideration mandated by the Reg-Neg Act is whether 
the agency will use the committee's consensus as the basis for its 
proposed rule.96 Usually the agency commits to incorporating any 
agreement reached by the negotiators into a notice of proposed rule-
making (NPRM) published in the Federal Register.97 This commit-
ment assures participants that their efforts will be worthwhile.98 Par-
90 See ADR Report, supra note 23, at 80 (providing logistical support, e.g., hires and pays 
mediator). 
91 See id. (providing data information and analyses). 
92 See id.; Harter, supra note 17, at 57 n.316 (participating as a party representing "public 
interest" as defined by organic statute, existing policies, and milieu in which it operates). 
93 See ADR Report, supra note 23, at 80 (recognizing that agency "occupies the seat of the 
800-pound gorilla',). 
94 See Harter, 8Upra note 17, at 59. For example, during the 1986 hazardous and solid waste 
negotiations, EPA's refusal to commit itself substantively or procedurally left "increasingly 
frantic participants to playa guessing game on how the EPA staff would come out if left. to their 
own devices." Rena Steinzor & Scott Strauss, Building a Consensus: Agencies Stressing Reg 
Neg Approach, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at 16. 
95 See Rosemary O'Leary, Environmental Mediation: What Do We Know and HfYW Do We 
Know It?, in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS, supra note 14, at 17,25. An additional 
risk of agency nonparticipation is the ''not invented here" syndrome which provides an agency 
with an incentive to find fault with the recommendation. See Harter, BUpra note 17, at 60. Harter 
also recognizes potential disadvantages of agency participation. See id. at 63. First, other parties 
may accord the agency unusual status, perhaps posturing to preserve their positions for judicial 
challenges. See id. Second, parties may fear the misuse of concessions and compromises made 
during unsuccessful negotiations when the agency issues its own decision. See id. Harter 
suggests that procedural devices can adequately address these concerns. See id. 
96 Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(7) (1994). This element is qualified by the 
agency's legal obligations: any consensus inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act 
or the agency's enabling statute will be rejected. See id. 
97 See Harter, BUpra note 17, at 100. EPA usually will commit to using an advisory committee's 
consensus as the basis of its NPRM unless that consensus is unjustified or outside EPA's 
statutory authority. See, e.g., Pesticide Notice, BUpra note 12, at 38,032. 
98 See Susskind & McMahon, BUpra note 6, at 140 (emphasizing importance of acceptable 
method of implementing final agreement). 
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ties are likely to invest sufficient resources to reach agreement only 
if they are confident about the implementation of that agreement.99 
C. Procedural Components of Negotiated Rulemaking 
1. Convening 
Any person interested in an upcoming regulation can initiate nego-
tiated rulemaking by suggesting it as an appropriate supplement to 
the traditional rulemaking process.1OO The agency, with the assistance 
of conveners who are usually private professionals in the mediation 
field, then assesses the issue's suitability for negotiation.1Ol This pre-
liminary assessment of whether the selection criteria are met is fol-
lowed by a Federal Register notice of intent to form an advisory 
committee.102 Interested parties not initially invited to participate 
may petition the agency for representation or membership in the 
negotiating groUp.l03 The agency and convener then determine (1) 
whether the petitioner will be affected substantially by the rule; (2) 
if so, whether it is represented by a current member of the negotiat-
ing group; and (3) whether, in any event, the petitioner should par-
ticipate, or whether interests can be consolidated in a way that pro-
vides adequate representation.104 
In addition to determining who should participate in the negotia-
tions, conveners assist in structuring the negotiations.lo5 The amount 
of time devoted to the process varies widely, depending on whether 
the agency has a clear deadline for resolving the issue.106 Negotiating 
parties usually meet on a monthly basis for one to two days.l07 Work 
or task-group meetings, conference calls, and document exchanges 
supplement the formal sessions.108 
99 See Harter, supra note 17, at 5l. 
100 Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations: A Practical Perspective, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Inst.) 10,647 (1992). 
101 See Ryan, supra note 14, at 210. ACUS defines "convener" as "an individual, government 
agency, or private organization, neutral with respect to the regulatory policy issues under 
consideration." Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1982) (Rec-
ommendation 82-4). 
102 See, e.g., Intent to Form Advisory Committee to Negotiated Nonconformance Penalty, 49 
Fed. Reg. 17,576 (1984). 
103 See 1 C.F.R. § 305. 
104 See id. 
106 See Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 40, at 3l. 
106 See Ryan, supra note 14, at 212. EPA negotiations have taken from four to eighteen 
months. See id. 
107 See id. 
108 See id.; Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,649. 
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2. Training 
Because many participants, including agency personnel, may not 
have significant negotiation experience, training and orientation ses-
sions often precede regulatory negotiations.109 On the day before the 
actual negotiations, agencies typically provide several hours of lec-
tures on negotiation techniques and principles, demonstrations, and 
practice exercises.uo These sessions offset the potentially wide dispar-
ity in experience among participants and develop common under-
standings of key concepts, terms, and roles.111 In addition to augment-
ing the participants' skills, pre-negotiation training offers an informal, 
neutral setting that encourages parties to build constructive relation-
ships.u2 EPA officials claim that the training contributes greatly to 
the operation and success of the subsequent negotiations. us 
3. Mediator Services and Ground Rules 
An essential role in the negotiated rulemaking process belongs to 
someone who is involved in neither the substantive development nor 
the enforcement of the regulation-the facilitator,u4 As an advocate 
of the process rather than of any particular interest, the facilitator 
chairs the negotiations and ensures that sessions run smoothly by 
helping participants define and reach consensus.U6 The facilitator, val-
ued more for prior mediation experience than technical expertise, also 
determines the feasibility of negotiating specific issues.u6 
109 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 193; see also Procedures for Negotiating 
Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommendation 85-4). 
110 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 194-95; ADR Report, supra note 23, at 64. 
111 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 154 (speculating that training provided by EPA's 
facilitator may have helped equalize ability levels). 
112 See id.; see also Training Session on Negotiating Techniques for the Pesticide Exemption 
Negotiating Committee, in PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 199. 
113 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 194. The negotiating committee on employment 
discrimination in air travel defined "success" as the "best possible consensus agreement on some 
or all elements of a rule." [d. at 197. 
114 See Intent to Form Advisory Committee to Negotiated Nonconformance Penalty, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 17,576,17,578 (1984); Fiorino & Kinz, supra note 40, at 31. The term "mediator" is used 
interchangeably with "facilitator." See ADR Report, supra note 23, at 81. Harter, however, notes 
a distinction between the two: mediators generally become more involved in helping parties 
address issues. [d. 
116 See 49 Fed. Reg. at 17,578; ADR Report, supra note 23, at 81 (referring to facilitator as 
"traffic cop" of meetings). 
116 See 49 Fed. Reg. at 17,578. A participant in Federal Communications Commission's mobile 
satellite services negotiations stressed the need for facilitators to be creative, capable ofincreas-
ing receptivity to possible outcomes, and able to persuade parties to abandon positions that have 
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One of a facilitator's first tasks is to help participants establish 
ground rules or organizational protocols to govern the negotiations.ll7 
Ground rules address issues such as the time, place, and duration of 
meetings; the implications of participation on future legal proceed-
ings; the approach to the withdrawal of committee members and to 
requests by new parties to be added; and the manner in which nego-
tiations are to conclude. us A common protocol establishes the group's 
definition of consensus.U9 Unless parties agree to another specified 
definition, the Reg-Neg Act defines consensus as "unanimous concur-
rence among the interests.1I120 Ground rules also remind negotiators 
that their primary focus should be to reach a mutually acceptable 
agreement rather than to secure victory for their constituents.121 
4. Judicial Review 
Although negotiated rules are less likely to be challenged in court 
than rules made through traditional rulemaking, both may be subject 
to judicial review for the same reasons.l22 Negotiators rarely agree to 
be barred from subsequent litigation by virtue of their participation 
in the process.123 Furthermore, dissatisfied parties who had no role in 
the negotiations can challenge the rules. l24 Whether courts should or 
do evaluate negotiated rules with more deference is subject to de-
bate.l25 
brought them to impasse. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Reflections on Negotiated Rulemaking: 
From Conflict to Consensus, WASH. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 42, ~7. But see Telephone 
interview with Mike Domenica, Engineer and CSO negotiations representative of the Massa-
chusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) (Feb. 10, 1997) (advising that facilitator should 
have enough background in subject area to understand nub of issues). 
117 See Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,648; Harter, supra note 17, at 82. 
118 See Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 40, at 33; Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,648-49; Harter, 
supra note 53, at 70. 
119 See Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 40, at 33. 
120 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U .S.C. § 562(2) (1994). 
121 See Harter, supra note 17, at 83. The National Coal Policy Project developed the following 
protocols which helped generate workable solutions: "Data should not be withheld from the 
other side. Delaying tactics should not be used .... Dogmatism should be avoided. Extremism 
should be countered forcefully ... but not in kind." Id. (citation omitted). 
122 See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text; see also 5 U .S.C. § 570. In contrast, courts 
will not recognize any cause of action related to an agency's establishment, assistance, or 
termination of a negotiated rulemaking committee. See id. 
122 See, e.g., Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 40, at 33 (citing EPA protocol). 
124 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1994) (providing that any person ag-
grieved by agency action has standing to seek judicial review). 
125 Compare, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for 
the Courts? 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1,33 (1985) with Harter, supra note 53, at 69. 
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In support of a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny is the argument 
that negotiated rulemaking renders the usual "hard look" review 
unnecessary.l26 The negotiation process itself ensures that agencies 
address the relevant issues and interests, conduct adequate research, 
and carefully analyze all proposals before choosing the best one.127 The 
product therefore should be sustained as long as it actually reflects a 
consensus and is within the agency's authority.128 On the other hand, 
potential flaws in negotiated rulemaking caution against limited judi-
cial review of its product.129 The Reg-Neg Act purported to resolve 
the controversy by providing that negotiated rules shall not be ac-
corded any greater deference than traditional rules.13o However, 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
Judge Patricia M. Wald noted that it would be absurd to prevent 
judges from acknowledging the process: "It is hard to think that the 
court will not take into account that the agency had all the relevant 
interests sitting around at the table, that they all agreed on this 
result, and that that statement of consensus is there in the Federal 
Register."131 
III. BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL CONCERNS 
A. Benefits 
Benefits that accrue to negotiated rulemaking participants corre-
spond to the criticisms of traditional rulemaking.l32 In particular, pro-
ponents of negotiated rulemaking claim that it increases public par-
ticipation,133 fosters nonadversarial relationships,l34 and reduces 
long-term regulatory costS.IS6 
Traditionally, agencies have limited the avenues for public partici-
pation in the rulemaking process to reaction and criticism, releasing 
rules for the public's comment after they have been developed inter-
126 See Harter, supra note 17, at 102--03. 
127 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 164. 
128 See id. 
129 See Wald, supra note 125, at 20, 24 (raising concerns about whether consensus represents 
appropriate interests). 
1110 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 570 (1994); Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,648. 
131 Fifth Annual Byrd Conference, supra note 21, at 61; Susskind interview, supra note 4. 
1112 See Thomas, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
133 See Harter, supra note 17, at 7; Four Perspectives, supra' note 68, at 8; Williamson inter-
view, supra note 4. 
134 See Harter, supra note 17, at 28; Thomas, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
136 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommen-
dation 85-4); Colloquium, Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Robert C. Byrd Conference on the 
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nally.136 In contrast, negotiated rulemaking elicits wider involvement 
at the early stages of production.137 Input from non-agency and non-
governmental actors, who may possess the most relevant knowledge 
and who will be most affected by the rule, is a prerequisite to effective 
regulation.138 Increased participation also leads to what Professor 
Harter considers the overarching benefit of negotiations: greater le-
gitimacy.139 
Whereas traditional rulemaking lends itself to adversarialism,140 
negotiated rulemaking is designed to foster cooperation and accom-
modation.141 Rather than clinging to extreme positions, parties priori-
tize the underlying issues and seek trade-offs to maximize their over-
all interests. l42 Participants, including the agency, discover and 
address one another's concerns directly.l43 The give-and-take of this 
process provides an opportunity for parties with differing viewpoints 
to test data and arguments directly.l44 The resultant exploration of 
different approaches is more likely than the usual notice and comment 
process to generate creative solutions and avoid ossification.l45 
Administrative Process, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 251, 266 (1996) [hereinafter Sixth Annual Byrd 
Conference]. 
136 See Four Perspectives, supra note 68, at 8, 10. Mediator and former EPA Region 1 
Administrator John McGlennon observed that the process whereby "a few individuals in a back 
room at EPA come up with a draft rule that is circulated around EPA ... ignores the collective 
thinking of the impacted parties who then take shots at the published rule and are immediately 
positioned in adversarial relationships." Id; see also E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemak-
ing, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992) ("Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public partici-
pation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions-a highly stylized process for displaying 
in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues."). 
137 See Four Perspectives, supra note 68, at 8. 
138 See supra notes 63~8 and accompanying text; see also Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by 
Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REV. 201, 212 (1937) (warning that policy devised without adequate 
input from those most affected will produce inferior regulation); Four Perspectives, supra note 
68, at 8 (encouraging federal agencies to model more wholesome, inclusive process for develop-
ing regulations that has led to greater ease of implementation on state level). 
139 See Harter, supra note 17, at 7, 31. 
140 See, e.g., Four Perspectives, supra note 68, at 8. One negotiator described his past experi-
ence with formal rulemaking: "We yell at them, they yell at us and matters end up in court quite 
often." Id. 
141 See Harter, supra note 17, at 29; Thomas, supra note 4, at~. 
142 See Harter, supra note 17, at 50; see also ADR Report, supra note 23, at 83 (reminding 
negotiators that their intransigence will be mirrored by others: "No points are scored for 
hardline, extreme positions."). 
143 See Lassila, supra note 19, at 6. A former EPA administrator compared this to traditional 
rulemaking: "In the classic mode of writing regs, the EPA staff retire to chambers to be 
bombarded with conflicting, confusing recommendations from various points of view." Id. 
144 See Goldberg, supra note 116, at 46-47; Harter, supra note 17, at 7. 
145 See Four Perspectives, supra note 68, at 10; see also Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,651. 
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Whether or not it results in a rule, negotiated rulemaking estab-
lishes valuable links between groups that otherwise would only com-
municate in an adversarial context.l46 Rather than trying to outsmart 
one another, former competitors become part of a team which must 
consider the needs of each member.147 Working relationships devel-
oped during negotiations give participants an understanding of the 
other side.l48 As one negotiator reflected, in "working with the oppo-
sition you find they're not quite the ogres you thought they were, and 
they don't hate you as much as you thought."149 The chance to iron out 
what are often long-standing disagreements can only improve future 
interactions. 160 
Admittedly, participation in regulatory negotiations requires a 
costly commitment of time and other resources.161 The process can be 
labor-intensive and grueling; for "each moment of inspiration, there 
are countless moments of turmoil and tedium."l62 Yet despite the 
substantial initial expenditure, costs associated with negotiated rule-
making are arguably more than offset by long-term savings.l63 Regu-
lated parties are more likely to comply with the outcome of a collabo-
rative effort than a regulation mandated from above with no 
consultation.l64 More importantly in terms of the agency's resources, 
participants will be less inclined to sue.l66 Thus, successful negotia-
tions will reduce the defensive costs of issuing a final regulation and 
146 See Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,652; Thomas, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
147 See Four Perspectives, supra note 68, at 9. 
148 See Lawrence Susskind & Laura Van Dam, Squaring Off at the Thble, Not in the Courts, 
TECH. REV., July 1986, at 37. 
149 [d. 
150 See id. (observing improved relations EPA engendered with parties who historically had 
been critical of its past regulatory approach). 
161 See Ryan, supra note 14, at 214-15. EPA, for example, spent $1 million to gather and 
analyze data in preparation for its wood stove negotiations. See id.; see also Olpin et al., supra 
note 41, at 579 (comparing thirty days of working on wood stove rule to estimated three days 
he would have spent writing comments on draft rule for traditional rulemaking); Four Perspec-
tives, supra note 68, at 9. 
152 Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,651; see Lassila, supra note 19, at 6. 
163 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1985) (Recommen-
dation 85-4); Sixth Annual Byrd Conference, supra note 135. One commentator argues that a 
more comprehensive analysis of negotiated rulemaking costs is necessary to determine whether 
it actually saves time and money. See Ryan, supra note 14, at 215. 
164 Miller, supra note 4, at 20. 
166 See id.; Thomas, supra note 4, at 3-4 (explaining how feeling of "ownership" of regulation 
by negotiators translates into high compliance; negotiators understand what regulation means 
and what is expected of them once it is finalized); Williamson interview, supra note 4. 
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the likelihood of expensive judicial challenges, as well as enforcement 
expenses.l66 
Negotiated rulemaking also reduces the amount of time required 
to make a rule.l67 For example, EPA averages two and one-half years 
to negotiate and promulgate a major rule in comparison to the three 
and one-half years necessary to develop a regulation through the 
traditional process.l68 
B. N ondeZegation Doctrine 
Critics of negotiated rulemaking often raise issues concerning the 
nondelegation doctrine: agencies cannot delegate their authority to 
groups of private citizens who are even less politically accountable 
than the agencies themselves.l69 The argument is that these private 
groups, while an important source of information about both technical 
and political matters, cannot effectively represent the public inter-
est.loo For the following reasons, however, delegation concerns prob-
ably are exaggerated and superficial. l6l 
First, negotiators only serve in an advisory capacity; authority to 
make final decisions rests exclusively with the agency.l62 Although an 
agency may agree to act as the theoretical equal of the other negotia-
tors, it never delegates or relinquishes its ultimate power to propose 
a rule on its own.l63 
16B See Miller, supra note 4, at 20; see also Harter, supra note 17, at 56. Furthermore, 
participation costs can be defrayed by opportunities for assistance. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.85-5; 
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. § 568(c) (1994) (providing that under prescribed circum-
stances, an agency may pay for a negotiator's travel and per diem expenses in addition to 
technical assistance and a reasonable rate of compensation); see also Siegler, supra note 100, at 
10,648. 
167 See BREYER & STEWART, supra note 15, at 609. 
168 See id. 
168 See Perritt, supra note 17, at 901; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 158 n.121. 
160 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a 
Model?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1296 (1994) (arguing that legitimate and important role of 
environmental organizations does not imply that they can speak for public in regulatory nego-
tiations); see also William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and 
the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 57 (1987) (arguing that one 
"successful" EPA negotiation generated a proposed rule that disregarded public interest as 
reflected in statutory requirements; negotiation tends ''to obscure, if not pervert, the public 
interest to the benefit of private interest"). 
161 See Perritt, supra note 17, at 900; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 158 n.121. 
1611 See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1982) (Recommen-
dation 82-4). 
168 In the sense that the agency retains its ultimate authority, equality among the parties 
around the negotiating table is a fiction. See Fiorino, supra note 79, at 769; see also Harter, 
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Safeguards ensuring adequate representation of affected groups 
further mitigate delegation concerns.l64 Rather than perpetuating re-
source imbalances, negotiated rulemaking is a way of leveling the 
playing field. l65 For example, environmental interest groups are often 
outnumbered by and have uncertain power in relation to industry 
representatives.l66 In a facilitated negotiation, however, environmen-
talists are capable of holding their own, and are likely to have greater 
influence than they would in a normal rulemaking proceeding.l67 
Moreover, the product of negotiated rulemaking is subject to judi-
cial review.l68 Every agency regulation must be able to survive the 
three standards of judicial scrutiny: (1) arbitrary and capricious; (2) 
within statutory authority; and (3) in accord with statutory proce-
dures.1OO A rule that passes these tests necessarily passes muster 
under the nondelegation doctrine.170 Judicial review provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Reg-Neg Act counter any 
political accountability concerns. 
IV. EPA AND NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING 
EPA officially began its pilot Reg-Neg Project in February of 1983 
by publishing a notice in the Federal Register. l7l The project's objec-
tive was to determine whether negotiation, as an early supplement to 
rulemaking, could increase the efficiency of the rulemaking process 
and decrease the likelihood of litigation.l72 EPA solicited proposed 
supra note 53, at 65 (emphasizing that agencies remain sovereign because they alone make final 
decisions). 
184 See Perritt, supra note 17, at 902; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 158 n.121 
(estimating that political accountability under negotiated rulemaking is greater than when the 
agency makes rules unilaterally); Susskind & Van Dam, supra note 148, at 42 (dispelling fear 
that negotiators might "cozy up together" or be co-opted). 
165 See Siegler, supra note 100, at 10,652; see also Fifth Annual Byrd Conference, supra note 
21, at 60. 
166 See Siegler, 8Upra note 100, at 10,652. 
167 See id.; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 154-55 (explaining ways in which process 
empowers all parties while constraining the most powerful); see also Olpin et aI., 8Upra note 41, 
at 582 (describing negotiations as a tremendous educational opportunity for environmental 
groups, a chance to gain access to technical experts and resources). 
166 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). 
169 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 158 n.121. 
170 See id.; Perritt, supra note 17, at 902. 
171 See EPA Notices, Regulatory Negotiation Project, 48 Fed. Reg. 7,494 (1983). 
1'12 See id. EPA sought to examine the utility of developing regulations by negotiation, the 
types of regulations most appropriate for negotiated rulemaking, and the procedures and 
circumstances that foster the most effective negotiations. [d. 
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areas of regulation as candidates for negotiated rulemaking.l73 The 
public submitted a number of suggestions, most of which were re-
jected for failure to meet ACUS's selection criteria.l74 Two of the 
candidates eventually used by EPA, nonconformance penalties for 
vehicle emissions and emergency exemptions from pesticide regula-
tions, demonstrate both the advantages and the challenges of negoti-
ated rulemaking.l75 
As a result of its consistent and successful commitment to negoti-
ated rulemaking, EPA is a model reg-neg agency.l76 Regulatory nego-
tiation now is part of the Agency's institutional fabric.177 EPA has 
sponsored approximately one-third of all federal agency negotiated 
rulemakings and devotes an entire office to the coordination and 
promotion of the process.178 Chris Kirtz, the lawyer who heads EPA's 
Reg-Neg Project,179 considers negotiated rules "more innovative, 
pragmatic, environmentally effective and easier to implement" than 
rules produced through traditional rulemaking.l80 
Negotiated rulemaking may have found fertile ground with EPA 
because environmental issues rarely are amenable to "one size fits all" 
solutions. l8l Successful environmental regulation often requires a 
partnership between federal, state, and local governments, in addition 
to private interests.l82 Combined sewer overflows, the technical and 
financial obstacles of which have eluded resolution for over twenty 
years, epitomize the complexity of problems under EPA's jurisdic-
tion.l83 
173 See id. at 7,494-95 (listing selection criteria to help identify negotiable topics). 
174 See Intent to Form Advisory Committee to Negotiate Nonconformance Penalty Regula-
tions, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,576, 17,579 (1984); Perritt, supra note 50, at 1674-75. 
175 See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 50, at 1674-82; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 143-50. 
176 See Ryan, supra note 14, at 203; PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 9. 
177 See Steinzor & Strauss, supra note 94, at 16 (citing former EPA Administrator Lee 
Thomas); Thomas, supra note 4, at 3 (labeling EPA regulatory negotiations successful in terms 
of timeliness, ability to get as much technical information as possible on the table, and lack of 
litigation once regulation is complete). 
178 See PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 1, at 9, 23; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 
160 (discussing what is now the Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation (OPPE». EPA also 
uses other collaborative innovations such as public hearings and roundtables. See PRITZKER & 
DALTON, supra note 1, at 53-55. 
179 See Lavelle, supra note 78, at 22. 
180 See Stephen John, EPA Combined Sewer Policy Provides Local Flexibility, NATION'S 
CITIES WEEKLY, Apr. 18, 1994, at 14. 
181 See id. 
182 See Risk Assessment and Cost/Benefit Analysis: Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Science, l04th Congo 15 (1995) (statement of Gordon R. Garner, Executive Director of Louisville 
and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District). 
183 See David S. Bailey, The Light at the End of the Sewer: How Interested Parties Negotiated 
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V. COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS (CSOS) 
A. History 
Many communities with CSO problems today designed their drain-
age systems in the late 1800s, when the primary concern was removal 
of animal and human wastes from streets.l84 In order to reduce costs, 
cities built single pipes that combined sewage and stormwater sys-
tems.l85 Combined sewers were considered a major improvement over 
the previous system of raw sewage running down city streets.l86 
Wastewater treatment had yet to become standard practice; people 
assumed that the lakes, rivers, and bays receiving the wastewater 
would be able to assimilate and dispose of it. l87 
These wastewater systems, now called "combined sewer systems" 
(CSSs), carry sanitary sewage from domestic, commercial, and indus-
trial sources. In addition to sewage, the single pipes convey surface 
drainage from rainfall or snowmelt to treatment facilities. l88 The ma-
jority of communities with CSSs are located in the Northeast and 
Great Lakes regions.189 Nationwide, EPA estimates that there are 
a Consensus Solution to the Combined Sewer Overflow Problem, in NATIONAL WATER RE-
SOURCES REGULATION: WHERE IS THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM Now?, 204 (Howard 
Holme ed., 1994). Technically, CSOs have been in violation of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (the Clean Water Act or CWA) since 1977. See Nancy J. Wheatley, The Regulatory 
Pendulum: Has It Finally Come to Restfor CSO Control?, in NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES 
REGULATION: WHERE IS THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM Now?, 187, 188. The D.C. Circuit 
declared CSOs to be point sources subject to NPDES permits in 1980. See Montgomery Envtl. 
Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
lB4 See Joel B. Eisen, Towards a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from Federal Regulation of 
Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1,24 (1995); Lack of Federal 
Funds for Water Pollution, Other Environmental Projects, Cited by Mayors, 20 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 601 (July 28, 1989) (explaining that more modem separate sewer systems do not face 
CSO problem); see also Clean Water Reauthorization: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. 
on Water Resources and Env't of the Comm. on Pub. Works and 'Pransp., 103rd Congo 73 (1994) 
(statement of Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator) (referring to combined sewers as "a 
remnant of the country's earliest water infrastructure"). 
185 See Eisen, supra note 184, at 24. 
lB6 See Combined Sewer Overflows: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation and the Env't, and the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Great Lakes of the 
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th Congo 115-16 (1990) [hereinafter CSO 
Hearings] (statement of Clyde Wilber, Water Pollution Control Federation). 
187 See id. at 116. 
188 U.S. EPA, COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS: GUIDANCE FOR NINE MINIMUM CONTROLS 
(1995) [hereinafter NMC GUIDANCE] at 1-1. 
189 See id.; Peter Crane Anderson, Note, The CSO Sleeping Giant: Combined Sewer Overflow 
or Congressional Stalling Objective, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 371, 376 (1992). Almost 85% of CSOs 
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approximately 1,100 CSSs which serve about 43 million people.1OO In 
dry weather, the flow in a combined sewer consists of domestic sew-
age, commercial and industrial wastes, and groundwater infiltration.191 
During periods of rainfall or snowmelt, stormwater runoff and storm-
water induced infiltration contribute to the regular flow.192 
Wet weather flows carry the risk of exceeding the capacity of the 
CSSs or the treatment facilities. 1OO When its capacity is overloaded, a 
CSS discharges directly to surface water bodies, including lakes, riv-
ers, estuaries, and coastal waters.194 Such discharge into receiving 
water prior to reaching a treatment facility constitutes a CSO.196 
B. Impact 
During wet weather, CSOs dump a combination of untreated sew-
age, industrial wastes, and contaminated stormwater into receiving 
water bodies.196 Thus, in addition to all of the pollutants normally 
present in stormwater,197 CSO discharges contain sewage contami-
nants.198 These pollutants include untreated or raw human sewage; 
bacteria, viruses, and other pathogens at extremely high levels; and 
are in the following 11 states: Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, Penn-
sylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Clean Water Act Reauthorization: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Congo (1995) (testimony of 
the Natural Resources Defense Council) [hereinafter NRDC testimony]. 
190 See NMC GUIDANCE, supra note 188, at 1-1. Most major municipal areas in the United 
States rely upon a combination of sanitary sewers, separate storm sewers, and combined 
sanitary and storm sewers. National Combined Sewer Ove1jWw Control Strategy, 54 Fed. Reg. 
37,370,37,371 (1989). 
191 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 37,371. 
192 See m. 
lIl1! See NMC GUIDANCE, supra note 188, at 1-1. Although overflows rarely occur during dry 
weather, they can if groundwater infiltrates through substantial leaks in a collection system. 
See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 187. 
194 See NMC GUIDANCE, supra note 188, at 1-1. 
196 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 37,371. CSOs should be distinguished from bypasses, which are 
''intentional diversions of waste streams from any portion of a treatment facility." [d. Bypasses 
are subject to different regulations, and prohibited unless (1) they are unavoidable to prevent 
loss of life, personal injury or severe property damage; (2) no feasible alternatives exist, such 
as the use of auxiliary treatment facilities, retention of untreated wastes, or maintenance during 
normal periods of equipment; and (3) the permittee submitted notices as required under federal 
regulations. [d. 
196 See NRDC testimony, supra note 189. 
197 Stormwater is far from benign "cleansing rain." See m. It contains toxic metals, oil and 
grease from vehicles, pesticides from lawns and parks, disease-causing microorganisms, and 
high levels of sediments and nutrients. [d. 
198 See m. at 45. 
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toxic industrial contaminants.l99 A 1992 study estimated that esos 
release between four and fourteen billion pounds of solids and organic 
matters on a yearly basis nationwide.2°O 
The adverse impact of esos is as multifaceted as it is severe.201 
Impairment of shorelines and shellfish waters are two of the major 
effects of esos.202 In 1994 alone, eso discharges were responsible for 
more than 194 closings and advisories at U.S. beaches.203 esos de-
stroyed an estimated 500,000 bushel shellfish harvest in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts.204 The shellfish industry in New Bedford usually ex-
pects to gain $20,000,000 per year from this natural resource.205 Hu-
man health risks such as gastroenteritis result from direct contact 
with eso discharge or consumption of contaminated fish or shell-
fish.206 Water quality risks not only increase drinking water treatment 
costs, but shut down freshwater bodies for recreational uses such as 
fishing and swimming.207 Finally, aesthetic problems arising from the 
199 See id.; see also Clean Water Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of 
the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 194th Congo 61 (1995) (testimony of the 
NRDC) (referring to CSOs as "unhealthy soup" carrying array of biological and chemical 
contaminants that can doom health of an ecosystem). 
200 See RICHARD W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 14-15 (1993) (describing how 14 large cities deposit into surface 
waters more than 165 billion gallons of raw sewage mixed with polluted storm water and 
industrial discharge each year). Before MWRA commenced its Boston Harbor cleanup, CSOs 
discharged up to seven billion gallons of untreated sewage each year into the Harbor. Andrew 
Thomas Savage, Note, Boston Harbor: The Anatomy of a Court-Run Cleanup, 22 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 365,376 (1995). 
201 See, e.g., EPA Issues Consensus Policyfor Controlling Raw Sewage Discharges From the 
Nation's Wastewater Systems, EPA News 94-R-87, available in 1994 W.L. 120867; csa Hear-
ings, supra note 186, at 1~5 (statement of LaJuana S. Wilcher, Assistant Administrator, 
Office of Water, U.S. EPA) (explaining that impact will depend on frequency and size of overflow, 
nature of pollutants in discharge, and conditions and nature of receiving water body) [hereinaf-
ter Wilcher statement]; WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 
(1986) § 4.31 at 455 (citing Comptroller General who observed that CSOs cause "millions of 
dollars of damage each year-and untold pollution, inconvenience and disgust"). 
2<l! See Wilcher statement, supra note 201 (describing how more than 275,000 acres or 54% of 
harvest limited waters in the Northeast are affected by CSOs); NRDC testimony, supra note 
189 (estimating billions of tourism dollars lost when CSOs close popular beaches); csa Hear-
ings, supra note 186, at 126-27 (statement of the Honorable Frank Pallone of New Jersey) 
(explaining how CSOs are not just another acronym, but are culprits behind beach closings and 
washups of floatable materials, causing billion-dollar losses to shore businesses); Bailey, supra 
note 183, at 205. 
203 See NRDC testimony, supra note 189. 
204 See csa Hearings, supra note 186 (City of New Bedford, Massachusetts, Position Paper). 
206 See id. 
206 See EPA News, supra note 201; Wilber statement, supra note 186. 
207 See EPA News, supra note 201; NRDC testimony, supra note 189. 
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overflows include odors, sewage-related floatables, and discolored 
water.208 
e. CSO Challenges: Technological and Financial 
The complexity of esos presents an enormous technological chal-
lenge to affected communities.209 Due to the intermittent, sporadic 
nature of rainfall, overflows are highly variable.210 Traditional secon-
dary systems, which depend on a steady flow of wastewater, would 
be impractical to maintain during dry weather and incapable of with-
standing the eso shock loads during wet periods.211 The quality char-
acteristics and corresponding treatability of esos also vary from site 
to site and from storm to storm at a given site.212 Effective treatment 
typically requires precise characterization of the eso, application of 
computer models, and analysis of rain gauge records.213 
The technological complexity of eso correction places an over-
whelming financial burden on affected communities.214 In 1992, EPA 
projected the cost of treating esos over the next twenty years to be 
$41.2 billion.215 As the mayor of New Bedford testified before Con-
gress, only real dollars can eliminate the destructive force of esos; a 
thousand points of light will not suffice.216 New Bedford found itself 
208 See Wilber statement, supra note 186; EPA News, supra note 201. 
209 See Bailey, supra note 183, at 205; see also Wheatley, supra note 183, at 187. 
210 See U.S. EPA, MANUAL: COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW CONTROL 1 (1993) [hereinafter 
CSO CONTROL MANUAL]. 
211 See Bailey, supra note 183, at 207. 
212 See CSO CONTROL MANUAL, supra note 210, at 1; Wilber statement, supra note 186 
(demonstrating challenge and importance of matching technology to particular CSO and receiv-
ing water body). 
213 See CSO CONTROL MANUAL, supra note 210, at 1. 
214 See Browner, supra note 184 (recognizing significant price tag attached to CSO control); 
RODGERS, supra note 201, at 457 (describing CSO treatment options as "expensive, thankless, 
and begging for constituents"). 
216 See EPA Water Infrastructure Funding for Fiscal 1996: Hearings Before the House 
Subcomm. on VA, HUn, and Indep. Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., l04th Congo 
154 (1995) (statement of Wilber L. Thaxton, President of the National Utility Contractors 
Association). Cost data was extracted from actual construction costs, estimates developed for 
CSO facility plans, consultant-supplied data for specific projects, and other published sources. 
See CSO CONTROL MANUAL, supra note 210, at 93. This estimate does not even include land 
acquisition; engineering, legal, fiscal, or administrative services; contingencies; or construction 
loan interest. See id. Moreover, the intermittent use of CSO treatment facilities adds the 
difficulty of predicting operation and maintenance costs. See id. at 94. 
216 See Lack of Federal Funds for Water Pollution, Other Environmental Projects, Cited by 
Mayors, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 601 (July 28,1989). 
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in a bind similar to that of other cities: its CSO treatment projects 
required $560 million, while its total budget was only $116 million.217 
D. CSO Control Options 
Comprehensive control programs incorporate a combination of me-
thods to reduce CSO flows and pollutant loads.218 In selecting appro-
priate technology combinations, a community must identify the char-
acteristics of its CSS and overflows, including the impact of CSOs on 
receiving water uses, and establish performance goals for its control 
plan.219 Individual control measures usually fall within one of the fol-
lowing four categories.220 First, source controls are intended to reduce 
the quantity or improve the quality of runoff that enters the CSS.221 
Second, collection system controls target CSO flows and loads within 
the system by. either removing or diverting runoff, maximizing the 
volume of stored flow, or maximizing the system's capacity to convey 
flow to a publicly owned treatment works (POTW).222 Third, storage 
technologies increase the volume of wet weather flows that can be 
stored for subsequent treatment at the POTW upon restoration of 
treatment and conveyance capacity.223 Finally, treatment technologies 
reduce the CSO's pollutant load.224 
VI. GENERATION OF SUPPORT FOR CSO NEGOTIATIONS 
Partly due to the complexity of CSOs, EPA's clean water efforts 
initially focused on other point source discharges that were easier to 
217 See id.j see also Clean Water Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of 
the House Comm. on 7ransp. and Infrastructure, 104th Congo 48 (1995) (testimony of Repre-
sentative Peter Blute) (predicting that Fall River's court-ordered CSO project will jeopardize 
its fragile economic condition because textile-related industry, which depends on relatively 
inexpensive cost of water in Fall River, will be forced to move). 
218 See CSO CONTROL MANUAL, supra note 210, at 5-6 (identifying six effective options that 
currently are in wide use). 
219 See id. 
220 See U.S. EPA, COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS: GUIDANCE FOR LONG-TERM CONTROL 
PLAN 3-30 (1995) [hereinafter LTCP GUIDANCE]. 
221 See id. at 3-31, 3-32 (discussing source controls such as porous pavements, which allow 
storm water to drain through pavement to underlying soil, and street sweeping, which can 
prevent accumulation of dirt, debris, and associated pollutants). 
222 See id. at 8-38, 8-34 (discussing collection system controls such as conversion of CSS into 
separate storm water and sanitary sewage collection systems, and sewer line flushing). 
222 See id. at 8-37 (discussing such storage technologies as in-line, near-surface, off-line, and 
deep tunnel storage)j see also CSO CONTROL MANUAL, supra note 210, at 87. 
224 See LTCP GUIDANCE, supra note 220, at 8-88, 8-39 (discussing treatment technologies 
such as coarse screening, swirVvortex technologies, disinfection, and dechlorination). 
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define and address.225 In the mid-1980s, however, the Agency began 
to include CSO discharges among Clean Water Act violations.226 Mem-
bers of the National League of Cities (NLC) responded to the CSO 
enforcement activity by creating the CSO Partnership at their 1988 
conference.227 The CSO Partnership's mission statement declared its 
goal of achieving a "rational approach to CSO control that will protect 
the environment yet be implementable and affordable."228 The coali-
tion's initial agenda reflected the need for clarification of CSO control 
programs.229 
Several months after the CSO Partnership's creation, EPA publish-
ed the first guidance for issuing National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permits specifically related to CSOs (1989 
Strategy).230 EPA's 1989 Strategy announced three objectives: (1) to 
ensure that CSO discharges occur only as a result of wet weather; (2) 
to bring all wet weather CSO discharge points into compliance with 
the Clean Water Act's technology-based requirements and applicable 
state water quality standards; and (3) to minimize water quality, 
aquatic biota, and human health impacts from wet weather over-
flows.231 To provide guidance on what would satisfy the Clean Water 
Act requirements, EPA's 1989 Strategy listed six minimum technol-
ogy-based limitations.232 EPA expected implementation of these con-
trol measures to take place through the permitting process at the 
community and state levels.233 
225 See Wilcher statement, BUpra note 201; Interview with Brian Pitt, Engineer, EPA Region 
I, in Boston, Mass. (Jan. 17, 1997); RODGERS, BUpra note 201, at 456 (discussing how CSO Policy 
"wandered about, as befitting a truly intractable problem with no clearly recommended out-
come"). 
226 See Stephen F. John & Nancy J. Wheatley, Environmental Negotiation: Lessons from the 
Combined Sewer Overflow Policy 2 (on file with author). Technically, CSOs had been in violation 
of the CWA since 1977. See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 188. 
227 See John & Wheatley, BUpra note 226, at 4. 
228ld. at 4. 
229 See id. 
230 See Laura E. Sader, Combined Sewer Ove1j!ow Control Policy, 1 ENVTL. L. 609, 623 (1995). 
231 National Combined Sewer Ove1j!ow Control Strategy, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,370, 37,371 (1989). 
232 See id. at 37,372. These included (1) proper operation and regular maintenance programs 
for the sewer systems and combined sewer overflow points; (2) maximum use of the collection 
system for storage; (3) review and modification of pretreatment programs to assure CSO 
impacts are minimized; (4) maximization of flow to the POTW for treatment; (5) prohibition of 
dry weather flows; and (6) control of solid and floatable materials in CSO discharges. ld. 
233 See Kevin B. Smith, Combined Sewer Ove1j!owB and Sanitary Sewer Ove1j!ows: EPA's 
Re(fUtatory Approach and Policy Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 26 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,296, 10,298 (1996). 
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Despite its clear objectives, the 1989 Strategy failed to provide 
adequate direction for the regulation of CSOS.284 Municipalities, regu-
lators, and environmentalists argued over what types of control pro-
grams met the Clean Water Act's "Best Conventional Pollutant Con-
trol Technology" (BCT) and "Best Available Technology Economically 
Achievable" (BAT) standards.285 Other areas of concern needing EPA 
attention included the site-specific nature of CSOs and their impacts, 
the need for flexible, cost-effective solutions, and consideration of the 
timing of CSO controls.236 
Under the advisement of its Management Advisory Group, EPA 
began to assess the suitability of a negotiated policy dialogue for 
CSOS.237 LaJuana Wilcher, then Associate Administrator for EPA's 
Office of Water, recognized that affected communities had to be part-
ners rather than adversaries in developing control programs.288 The 
CSO issue satisfied many selection criteria for negotiated rulemak-
ing.289 In particular, there were limited, identifiable interests240 who 
represented a balance of power,241 and were willing to negotiate.242 
Several bills that CSO stakeholders perceived to be inappropriate 
were pending before Congress and provided a sense of urgency to the 
negotiations.243 Finally, EPA was eager to participate in the process 
234 See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 189. 
236 See id. 
236 See Smith, supra note 233. 
237 See John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 4. The Management Advisory Group (MAG) 
recommended the negotiation process to establish "appropriate design criteria for CSO control, 
standards for treatment technology, and appropriate time frames for CSO implementation." Id. 
(citing 1992 MAG Recommendations). 
238 See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 190. 
239 See supra notes 47-99 and accompanying text. 
240 See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 190 (listing five general interests: municipalities, technical 
associations, environmentalists, and state and federal regulators). 
241 See Telephone interview with Ross Brennan, National CSO Program Manager (Jan. 29, 
1997) (emphasizing shrewd analytical power of negotiators representing Environmental De-
fense Fund (EDF) and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC». 
242 See John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 4; Domenica interview, supra note 116 (noting 
that many municipalities faced court orders). 
243 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. For example, proposed secondary treatment for 
CSOs would have cost between $120 and $160 billion. See EPA News, supra note 201; see also 
Ports & Waterway Infrastructure: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight 
of the House Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103rd Congo 857-71 (1994) (statement of the 
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA». EPA, municipalities, and environ-
mentalists all considered such plans to be too stringent. Brennan interview, supra note 241. 
Stakeholders realized that failure to address the CSO challenge ran the risk of Congress 
enacting what many considered to be senseless legislation. Id. 
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and committed to incorporating any final consensus into its proposed 
policy.244 
VII. CSO CONTROL POLICY 
In July of 1992, EPA convened a group of fifteen organizations, 
representing the various interests affected by CSOS.245 At its first 
meeting, the CSO group with the assistance of an independent facili-
tator, RESOLVE, developed a set of process ground rules.246 The 
negotiators oriented themselves with a common glossary of terms, 
agreeing to define "consensus" as the absence of dissent by any mem-
ber.247 When they met as a full group, notices in the Federal Register 
invited the public to attend.248 Members also met in private sub-
groups, often either as the municipal or environmental caucus, to 
discuss negotiating positions and tactics.249 Many people who did not 
take part in the formal negotiations still participated actively in the 
overall process by raising and explaining issues to the negotiators.260 
The CSO group concluded its formal meetings in September of 
1992.261 Although the three months of negotiations were "messy and 
often contentious," participants eventually reached agreement on 
many issues.262 Parties clarified their positions in areas of continued 
disagreement, highlighting the obstacles to consensus on these 
points.263 EPA officials continued to meet with stakeholders on an 
informal basis in an effort to resolve the remaining disputes.2M 
244 See Brennan interview, supra note 241; Bee John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 5. 
245 See John & Wheatley, BUpra note 226, at 4--5. Stakeholders included the CSO Partnership, 
NLC, AMSA, National Association of Flood and Storm Water Management Agencies (NAF-
SMA), Water Environment Federation (WEF), American Public Works Association (APWA), 
Association. of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators, Lower James 
River Association, NRDC, EDF, Center for Marine Conservation, Sewage Treatment Out of 
the Park (STOP), Safely Treating Our Pollution (STOP), EPA, and several individual commu-
nities. See id. at 5; Bee alBo EPA News, supra note 201. 
248 See John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 4--5. RESOLVE is an independent program of the 
World Wildlife Fund. EPA contracted with RESOLVE to provide professional environmental 
mediators who facilitated the negotiation process. See id. at 4. 
247 See id. at 5; Domenica interview, supra note 116. 
248 See John & Wheatley, BUpra note 226, at 5. 
249 See id. 
260 See Interview with Ken Moraft', Attorney, EPA Region 1, in Boston, Mass. (Jan. 10, 1997). 
261 See John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 6. 
252 See id.; Domenica interview, BUpra note 116 (describing several heated discussions). 
263 See John, supra note 180, at 4. 
254 See John & Wheatley, supra note 2~6, at 6. 
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Abiding by its commitment to use the negotiations as the basis of 
its policy, EPA integrated the stakeholders' input into its framework 
document that was published in January of 1993.256 The draft CSO 
control policy invited the public to comment on its principles and 
provisions.256 A variety of interest groups, including many of the 
stakeholders, submitted forty-one sets of written comments.257 The 
response was largely supportive of the draft's provisions, pressing for 
only minor changes and clarification.258 
In April of 1994, EPA issued its final CSO policy statement (CSO 
Policy).259 The CSO Policy elaborates on the 1989 CSO Strategy. Its 
underlying purpose is to expedite compliance by coordinating the 
planning, selection, design, and implementation of CSO management 
practices and controls.260 Because the CSO Policy itself does not es-
tablish or affect legal rights or obligations, its enforcement mecha-
nism is the NPDES permit process.261 
In recognition of the site-specific nature of CSOs, the policy offers 
sufficient flexibility to tailor controls to particular situations.262 Part 
of this flexible approach is an emphasis on beginning with simple, 
low-cost controls before increasing treatment as deemed necessary.263 
Nine minimum controls (NMCs) which were to be implemented by 
January 1, 1997, focus on the operation and maintenance of existing 
systems.264 CSO permittees are also responsible for developing and 
implementing long-term control plans (LTCPs). Basic elements of an 
LTCP include (1) characterization, monitoring, and modeling of the 
CSS; (2) active involvement of the affected public;265 (3) consideration 
255 See EPA Notices, Combined Sewer Overflow Control Policy: Draft Guidance Availability, 
58 Fed. Reg. 4,994 (1993). 
266 See id. 
267 See Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688 (1994). 
268 See id.; John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 6. 
269 See 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688. 
260 See id. at 18,689. 
26) See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 191. Proposed CWA amendments that endorse the CSO 
Policy have not been successful. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 112, l04th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
262 See John, supra note 180, at 4. 
263 See Wheatley, supra note 183, at 191. 
264 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,691. The NMC are: (1) proper operation and regular maintenance 
programs for sewer system and CSOs; (2) maximum use of collection system for storage; (3) 
review and modification of pretreatment requirements to assure CSO impacts are minimized; 
(4) maximization of flow to POTW for treatment; (5) prohibition of CSOs during dry weather; 
(6) control of solid and floatable materials in CSOs; (7) pollution prevention; (8) public notification 
to ensure that public receives adequate notification of CSO occurrences and CSO impacts; and 
(9) monitoring to effectively characterize CSO impacts and efficacy of CSO controls. See id. 
266 The affected public includes rate payers, industrial users of sewer system, people who 
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of sensitive areas;266 (4) evaluation of alternatives;267 (5) cost/perform-
ance considerations;266 (6) operational plan; (7) maximizing existing 
treatment; (8) phased implementation schedule;269 and (9) post-con-
struction compliance monitoring program.270 
Reactions to the csa Policy have been overwhelmingly favor-
able.271 EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner proclaimed the negoti-
ated solution to be a "landmark agreement" -workable, affordable, 
and environmentally protective.272 The Clinton Administration dem-
onstrated its strong confidence in and commitment to the CSO Policy 
by recommending its incorporation into the Clean Water Act.273 Most 
importantly, municipal and environmental groups voiced public sup-
port for EPA's balancing act.274 
The negotiation process clearly generated a national consensus be-
hind the CSO Policy.276 Stakeholders who participated in developing 
its provisions subsequently endorsed the final product issued by 
EPA.276 They then conveyed their support to their respective con-
reside downstream from CSOs, and people who use and enjoy downstream waters. See 59 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,692. 
266 Recognizing that CSO discharges are most likely to conflict with WQSs in sensitive areas 
such as bathing beaches, water supplies, and shellfish waters, the policy aims to completely 
eliminate CSOs from these sites. See Bailey, supra note 183, at 208-09. Diversion or relocation 
of the outfalls is usually the most cost-effective method of eliminating sensitive area CSOs. See 
id. 
267 See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,692-93 (explaining presumption and demonstration ap-
proaches). 
268 Economic considerations played a major role in the CSO negotiations. See Bailey, supra 
note 183, at 206. Utilizing a "knee of the curve" analysis, the group sought points at which CSO 
controls achieved a maximum return in pollution reduction. See id.; see also CSO CONTROL 
MANUAL, supra note 210, at 21. 
269 "Implementation schedules are based on relative importance of adverse CSO impacts and 
on municipality's financial capability." Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Env't, 104th Cong (1995) (statement of Jeff Wennberg on behalf of NLC 
Energy, Environment, & National Resources Committee) [hereinafter NLC statement]. 
270 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,694. 
271 See, e.g., NRDC testimony, supra note 46; Tudor T. Davies & Timothy J. Kasten, EPA's 
Regulatory Process: A New Way of Doing Business, in NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES REGU-
LATION: WHERE IS THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM Now?, supra note 183, at 123, 127. 
272 See EPA News, supra note 201; Browner statement, supra note 184. 
273 See Smith, supra note 233, at 10,302 (citing U.S. EPA, PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CLEAN 
WATER INITIATIVE (1994». 
274 See John, supra note 180, at 4 (referring to surprisingly robust consensus in favor of CSO 
Policy); John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 6; see also AMSA statement, supra note 243. 
276 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. 
276 See, e.g., NLC statement, supra note 269; Bailey, supra note 183, at 204; Domenica inter-
view, supra note 116. 
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stituencies.277 The psychological benefit of this is immense: affected 
parties perceive the CSO Policy as something they agreed to rather 
than something imposed on them from above by administrative fiat.278 
Traditionally adversarial groups united to confront head-on the prob-
lem of CSOS.279 Although the alliance of environmentalists and munici-
palities experienced rocky moments, it held together and continues to 
manifest a favorable spirit toward the policy.280 
Whereas EPA's 1989 Strategy was a unilateral attempt to solve the 
CSO problem, the 1994 CSO Policy represents a collaborative effort. 
The heavy involvement of cities means that they have a strong un-
derstanding of the provisions, which in turn translates into easier 
implementation.281 Environmental groups appreciate the importance 
of flexibility and cost-effectiveness in protecting water quality.282 EPA 
officials, including National CSO Program Manager Ross Brennan, 
continue to tap into the network of negotiators and have consulted 
stakeholders during the preparation of several guidance documents.2&'! 
Epitomizing this legacy, city negotiators often refer Brennan back to 
the environmentalist representatives to resolve technical issues.284 
It would be na'ive to hail the CSO negotiations as a success without 
recognizing one particular drawback. The fact that certain provisions 
of the CSO Policy are subject to different interpretations has created 
somewhat of a regulatory headache.286 The desire to satisfy all partici-
pants may tempt an agency that sponsors a negotiated rulemaking to 
paper over differences when it produces the final rule or policy.286 Yet 
even those who voice this concern in the CSO context believe that, 
271 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. 
278 See id. 
2'19 See Domenica interview, supra note 116; NRDC testimony, supra note 199. 
280 See John & Wheatley, supra note 226, at 6 (pointing out uniqueness of CSO alliance between 
these two camps, which have been unable to reach accommodation on many other issues). 
281 See Pitt interview, 8Upra note 225. Conversely, the lack of extensive consultation with the 
cities in drafting the 1989 Strategy resulted in confusion over what EPA expected of them. See 
Brennan interview, supra note 241. 
282 See Bailey, 8Upra note 183, at 204. 
2811 See Brennan interview, supra note 241; U.S. EPA, Guidance for LTCP Memorandum, in 
LTCP GUIDANCE, supra note 220 (Aug. 31, 1995). 
284 See Brennan interview, 8Upra note 241. 
286 See Moraff interview, 8Upra note 250 (describing ambiguous way in which presumption 
approach was written); Pitt interview, supra note 225 (describing common understanding of 
issues, but differing views on how to prioritize issues). 
286 See Moraff interview, supra note 250; Pitt interview, supra note 225. 
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overall, the CSO Policy embodies sensible compromises made by the 
negotiators.287 CSO control plans once existed in the "never-never 
land" of unspecified programs.288 Now, however, they are rooted in the 
common ground reached by the stakeholders after months of negotia-
tion.289 
If one measures success in terms of a final solution to the CSO 
challenge, the CSO Policy would fail. CSOs continue to occur. They 
continue to present technical obstacles and impose financial bur-
dens.290 But, as the negotiator representing the Environmental De-
fense Fund recognized, any plan that guaranteed immediate resolu-
tion of these challenges would exist only on paper.291 When one 
measures success in terms of a solution to the CSO stalemate, the 
negotiations become worthy of the accolades bestowed upon them.292 
Stakeholders have united in their commitment to overcome the com-
plex challenges of CSOs. Significant strides have already been made 
in reducing the frequency with which they occur.293 
Although it is difficult to speculate as to what would exist now had 
the negotiations never occurred, it is unlikely that any of the CSO 
negotiators would be in a better position.294 The "hodge-podge," ad 
hoc approach probably would have continued in the absence of a 
partnership among the affected interests.295 Especially when com-
pared to the near total failure of the traditional regulatory system, 
the negotiators' success at addressing CSOs becomes clear.296 The 
CSO negotiations generated consensus among stakeholders-a con-
sensus that has prevented ossification in a most challenging area of 
regulation. 
287 See Moraff interview, supra note 250; Pitt interview, supra note 225; John, supra note 180, 
at 14 (noting that municipal caucus did not get everything it wanted in final policy). 
288 See Bailey, supra note 183, at 206. 
289 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. 
290 See Blute testimony, supra note 217; Sader, supra note 230, at 1; John, supra note 180, at 
14. 
291 See Bailey, supra note 183, at 209. 
292 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. This is consistent with negotiated rulemaking 
proponents' view that the process at least clarifies conflict, shares data, and airs differences in 
a constructive way. See John, supra note 180, at 14; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 6, at 159. 
293 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. Implementation of minimum controls alone has led 
to substantial reductions in the number of CSOs. See Pitt interview, supra note 225. In Boston, 
for example, EPA officials estimate that the number of permit points that discharge has dropped 
by more than 30. See id. 
294 See Bailey, supra note 183, at 206. 
296 See Brennan interview, supra note 241. 
296 See Bailey, supra note 183, at 206. 
